អ៊ុយក្រែន​ទទួល​បាន​ឧបករណ៍​យោធា​ដើម្បី​ទប់ទល់​នឹង​ការ​កើនឡើង​ដែល​រុស្ស៊ី​រំពឹង​ទុក​ក្នុង​ការ​ប្រើប្រាស់​គ្រាប់មីន

ថ្មីៗ កញ្ចប់ជំនួយយោធា from the United States to Ukraine included equipment specifically designed for mine warfare, including mine rollers, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs), and demolition equipment for obstacle clearing. These systems are indicative of an issue that Ukraine will face as the war continues – landmines. Although, landmines have been used throughout the conflict, Russian mine usage will likely escalate as they try to halt the Ukrainian counter-offensive.

The Russian arsenal includes a wide array of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. Doctrinally, mines are used as a deterrent, preventing enemy forces from moving into key terrain or accessing mobility corridors (e.g., roads, bridges). Breaching a minefield is a tedious process, during which time the enemy forces are moving slowly, making them easy targets for Russian artillery.

The most common Russian anti-tank mines are the TM-62 and the PTM-1. While both mines are capable of disabling most armored vehicles, the older TM-62 is hand or machine emplaced, while the PTM-1 is delivered remotely from a helicopter or artillery round. The newest Russian anti-tank mine is the PTKM-1R mine. When these mines detect a seismic signature, they launch a submunition into the air. The submunition then pinpoints the target and fires a shaped charge downwards at the target.

The Russians did not sign the Ottawa Treaty in 1997, which banned the use of anti-personnel mines. As such, the Russian arsenals include a wide array of anti-personnel mines. The most commonly used Russian anti-personnel mine is the PFM-1, often referred to as Butterfly Mines. They are shaped like a butterfly and are typically deployed in large numbers from mortars or aircraft, from which they glide to the ground and set. A newer Russian mine is the POM-3 mine, which functions similar to the PTKM-1R anti-tank mine. The mine is activated by a seismic sensor that detects a person approaching the mine; the POM-3 then ejects a submunition upwards that explodes outwards with a lethal radius of 16 meters.

Historically, the Russian/Soviet military extensively used anti-tank and anti-personnel mines during armed conflicts. During the invasion of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, the Soviet army littered the country with mines, many of which still remain. Similarly, they deployed large numbers of anti-personnel mines during the first and second Chechen wars. The usage of mines in these conflicts has resulted in a significant number of casualties both during and after the conflicts, as well as caused economic and social disruption in the regions.

In the current conflict, there have been reports of Russian mine usage in Ukraine, including anti-personnel mines in civilian areas. In August, the city of Donetsk was littered with PFM-1 mines; however, the Russians have argued that these mines were deployed by the Ukrainians. Ukrainian bomb disposal teams also cleared a number of POM-3 and PFM-1 mines from Kharkiv និង ឃឺសុន.

Note that mine usage is not limited to the Russian military in this war. The Ukrainians deployed TM-62 anti-tank mines early in the war to disrupt and stall the Russian invasion force. However, as signers of the Ottawa Treaty, the Ukrainian military is not deploying anti-personnel mines. Additionally, paramilitary groups, such as the Russian-backed Donetsk People’s Republic, have deployed a number of PTM-1 anti-tank mines.

As the Russian forces transition to being on the defense in south and east Ukraine, mine usage is expected to increase. The Russians have created a strong defensive line between the cities of Svatove and Kreminna in the Luhansk region. Furthermore, they have fortified the area to south of the Dnipro River in the Kherson region. These defensive lines would be expected to include minefields in conjunction with trenches and other obstacles. Russian artillery would be positioned to provide overwatch of these minefields and target Ukrainian forces should they push into them.

Meanwhile, the Russians need to hold several key towns across eastern Ukraine to ensure their logistical network. The Russians military and affiliated paramilitary groups may use anti-personnel mines to limit the movement of Ukrainian paramilitary groups operating in these areas, similar to what they did in Chechnya. Moreover, the presence of mines instills fear and intimidation among the local population, making it harder for them to resist their occupiers. Should the Russian forces retreat from a town, they would likely leave behind a number of anti-personnel mines making it time consuming for the Ukrainian forces to move into the town. This approach was seen in Kherson, which was heavily mined prior to the Russian departure in November.

The military aid package will provide some of the necessary assets for the Ukrainians to counter the Russian minefields. In particular, the mine rollers, are to be used on the Stryker armored fighting vehicles that are also included in the aid package. These mine rollers would allow Ukrainian forces to clear a path through a minefield. Meanwhile, the MRAPs will allow the Ukrainians to protect their soldiers as they move through mined areas. While an MRAP would still be disabled by most anti-tank mines, the passengers would remain safe. Though the press release did not provide details about the “demolition equipment for obstacle clearing,” this equipment is likely aimed towards clearing minefields as well.

The war continues to evolve and both sides have introduced new technologies onto the battlefield to provide themselves a decisive advantage. The latest shift in the war has Ukraine taking a more offensive position attacking Russian strongholds in Ukraine. History and doctrine indicate that the Russians will use mines to secure their position; meanwhile, the recent aid packages provide tools necessary for the Ukrainians to help counter this threat.